Simple majority voting does not allow preference intensities to be expressed, and hence fails to implement choice rules that take them into account. A vote-buying mechanism, instead, permits preference intensities to be revealed since each agent can buy any quantity of votes x to cast for an alternative of her choosing at a cost c(x) and the outcome is the most voted alternative. In the context of binary decisions, we characterize the class of choice rules implemented by vote-buying mechanisms. Rules in this class can assign any weight to preference intensities and to the number of supporters for each alternative.
Introduction
Consider a binary collective choice problem: a society must choose one of two alternatives.
Which alternative is socially preferable depends on the normative principles we have in mind. Political philosophers such as Locke (1689) argue that society should follow majority rule, disregarding the intensity of individual preferences. Alternatively, society might be utilitarian (Mill 1863 ) -thus, paying attention both to the number of supporters of each alternative and their preference intensities-or it could choose according to the desire of the individual with the most intense preference. These three rules are only examples within a wide class of choice rules that take into account the number of supporters of each alternative and/or their preference intensities. Each society may weigh individual preference intensities di¤erently, and hence each society may wish to follow a di¤erent choice rule from this class.
If society wishes to fully disregard intensity of preferences, it can reach a decision by majority rule. Otherwise, an optimal mechanism needs to weigh more heavily the preferences of agents with more intense preferences. However, practical constraints may in ‡uence which mechanism is used: some collective entities may have adopted majority rule not because they wish to ignore preference intensities, but because "one-person one-vote" majority rule is easier to run than more sophisticated mechanisms. If so, to the extent that technological advances in the …eld of encryption and data management (e.g. blockchain voting 1 ) make it easier to use more ‡exible forms of democracy, we expect calls for institutional innovation to enhance the opportunities to express preference intensities. Indeed, a number of organizations such as Google (Hardt and Lopes 2015) and some political parties in Europe (Blum and Zuber 2016) have recently experimented with procedures that endogenously redistribute political power among the concerned agents. Theoretical results ought to anticipate these developments -or at least, to anticipate their expansion into the public arena-in order to inform any decisions on institutional reform.
A recent literature on preference aggregation has shown that preference intensities can be 1 See for instance, Yermack (2017) .
taken into account in an extreme way via decentralized markets for votes: such mechanisms lead to the redistribution of political power and implement the alternative that is preferred by the agent who cares most about the outcome (Casella, Llorente-Saguer and Palfrey 2012).
We turn attention to centralized vote markets and in particular to vote-buying mechanisms:
each agent can express her intensity of preference by acquiring any quantity of votes x for either alternative, at a pre-announced monetary amount c(x) that is evenly distributed to the rest of the players, and the social choice is determined by the total number of votes cast for each alternative. Lalley and Weyl (2016) show that quadratic voting (i.e., the vote buying mechanism with c(x) = x 2 ) implements the utilitarian outcome. We show that for any weight that the society assigns to preference intensities relative to the number of supporters for each alternative, there exists a vote-buying mechanisms that implements the desired social choice rule. Moreover, we establish that well-behaved vote-buying mechanisms only implement choice rules that are optimal with respect to some weight on intensity of preferences. These results establish a complete two-way mapping between a simple kind of centralized vote markets and an intuitive class of choice rules, which di¤er in the weight that they assign to individuals' preference intensities. To our knowledge this is the …rst general class of mechanisms that allows preference intensities to be expressed to every possible degree.
To gain an intuition over our results, consider the following formalization. Suppose that each subject i would trade v i units of real wealth to change the social decision from a random coin toss to A with certainty; that is, the valuation v i measures how intensely subject i cares that society chooses A and not B (agents who prefer B have a negative valuation). Then, a possible normative choice rule for a given 2 R ++ , is to declare A a better choice if 2 Majority rule is the lower limit of this class, = 0: Utilitarianism corresponds to parameter = 1: it declares alternative A socially preferred if
v i > 0: At the higher limit of the class, the alternative socially preferred given = 1 is the alternative preferred by the agent whose valuation has the highest absolute value. Throughout the class of choice rules, the social preference according to a small is highly in ‡uenced by the number of agents who support each alternative, and less so by their intensity, while if is large the social preference better re ‡ects the preferences of the individuals whose well-being is greatly a¤ected by the decision.
A mechanism asymptotically implements a given choice rule if the probability that the mechanism chooses the alternative socially preferred according to this rule is arbitrarily close to one in su¢ ciently large societies. For each choice rule in our class, we …nd a vote-buying mechanism that asymptotically implements it. Further, we characterize the class of social choice rules that are asymptotically implementable by vote-buying mechanisms: we show that any vote-buying mechanism with limit cost elasticity lim x!0 c 0 (x)x c(x) = 1 + 1= asymptotically implements any social choice rule that asymptotically follows the choice rule with intensity parameter in our class; and any choice rule that does not asymptotically follow any rule in our class is not asymptotically implementable.
We derive our main result under the assumption -standard in the literature-that agents are risk neutral. If agents'utility over wealth is instead concave, rich agents acquire more votes, so if the distribution of preferences over the social choice is wealth-speci…c, the preferences of the poor end up under-represented. Optimality can be restored by allowing for richer mechanisms that condition the cost of voting on individual wealth (we discuss this extension in Section 4).
The mechanisms we consider are robust in the sense that at the time she designs the mechanism, the designer does not need to know the particular features of the society, such as the number of individuals, the exact distribution of types from which individual preferences are drawn, or the importance of the choice under consideration. Hence, we interpret the proposed vote-buying mechanisms as institutions which asymptotically implement the society's choice rule, regardless of changes in distributional parameters.
Literature Review
Our work builds on Lalley and Weyl (2016) , and on the broader literature on quadratic voting, including limit and heuristic approaches (Goeere and Zhang 2017; Lalley and Weyl 2018) , and the special issues 1 and 2 of Volume 172 of the journal Public Choice, edited by Weyl and Posner (2017) , in their entirety. 3 Like this literature, we propose vote-buying mechanisms to implement social choice correspondences in binary collective choice problems.
Unlike it, we look beyond utilitarianism: we let the mechanism designer embrace any of a large class of normative choice rules axiomatized by Roberts (1980) and Moulin (1988) , and we o¤er a mechanism that asymptotically chooses the alternative that is socially preferred according to the designer's choice rule.
This literature has deeper roots in classic mechanism design. The VCG mechanism (Vickrey 1961 , Clarke 1971 and Groves 1973 ) satis…es utilitarian e¢ ciency, but is not budgetbalanced. We want a budget-balanced mechanism. The mechanisms by Arrow (1979) and AGV (D'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet 1979) are budget-balanced and attain utilitarian e¢ -ciency by requiring each agent to pay the expected externality of her choices, but to calculate this expected externality, the designer must know population parameters such as the distribution from which individual preferences are drawn. The designer we have in mind does not have this information. Put di¤erently: the AGV mechanism works when it is designed speci…cally for a particular society with known population parameters at a speci…c point in time; whereas, we propose mechanisms that work for many societies that di¤er in their population parameters, so that the mechanism is robust as the values of exogenous parameters change across societies in space or time.
Related approaches to gauge intensity of preferences through voting involve majority voting with heterogenous turnout costs, or vote trading in a competitive market for votes. While our results generalize Lalley and Weyl's (2016) …nding that quadratic voting asymptotically attains utilitarian e¢ ciency, the two models are not nested: to obtain simpler and shorter proofs, we make assumptions on the payo¤ function that are substantially similar, but technically distinct. 4 A greater conceptual di¤erence between Lalley and Weyl (2016)'s approach and ours is that they study the properties of a particular mechanism; whereas, our theory is an exercise in implementation: for any desired social choice rule, a planner seeks to design a mechanism that implements it.
We follow traditional Bayesian implementation (Jackson 1991) to assume that citizens share a common prior about the society they live in, but we also assume, as in robust implementation (Bergemann and Morris 2013) , that the planner does not know this prior.
The planner's goal, and ours, is to design a mechanism such that given the planner's choice rule, for any realization of individual preferences, in any equilibrium of the mechanism, and in any society with any common prior, the equilibrium outcome coincides with the desired social choice. 4 Lalley and Weyl (2016) provide a more extensive discourse of quadratic voting, its precedents and related literature, its heuristic intuition, and potential challenges to its roll-out in real world applications; which broadly applies to all vote-buying mechanisms. We refer the interested reader to their insightful discussion, which we do not replicate here.
The Formal Framework
Summary. A set of agents must make a binary social choice. The decision is made via a vote-buying mechanism: agents purchase votes, and the alternative with the most votes is chosen. We characterize the set of social choice correspondences that are asymptotically implementable by these vote-buying mechanisms.
Social choice problem. A society N n of size n 2 Nnf1g must make a binary choice over fA; Bg: Let the social decision d 2 fA; Bg denote the alternative chosen.
Individual preferences. Each agent i 2 N n has preferences over real wealth and over the social decision, and also over lotteries over wealth pro…les paired with a social decision.
Under standard conditions (detailed in the working paper version Eguia and Xefteris 2018b), each agent i 0 s preference relation is representable by a quasilinear expected utility function that depends only on agent i 0 s valuation of the alternatives, on the social decision, and on the net transfer of wealth received by the agent. For ease of exposition, here we work directly with the quasilinear utility representation. or simply "valuation pro…le," and to N n as the valuation pro…le of B: Let i denote ( 1 ; :::; i 1 ; i+1 ; :::; n ):
Let F be a continuously di¤erentiable cumulative distribution function over [ 1; 1] with strictly positive density f over its domain, and no mass at any point. Let F be the set of all cumulative distributions. Let be a random variable with cumulative distribution F: We 5 The key conditions are separability over wealth and the social decision, and risk neutrality. It is standard in the literature to implicitly assume that preferences satisfy these conditions, and to treat the quasilinear utility function as a primitive (see, for instance, Krishna and Morgan 2015 or Lalley and Weyl 2016). assume that each attitude i is an independent draw of . Let N n denote the random vector composed of n independent draws of ; so the pro…le of attitudes N n is a realization of N n :
Vote-buying mechanisms. A vote-buying mechanism is de…ned by a cost function c : R ! R + : The mechanism invites each agent i 2 N n to choose any action a i 2 R: For any a 2 R; and any agent i 2 N n ; if agent i chooses action a i = x; then i pays a cost c(x):
All payments are redistributed equally among all other agents, so given a vector of actions a N n 2 R n ; each agent i 2 N n obtains a net nominal wealth transfer c(
Since agents care about real, not nominal, wealth, their incentives are a¤ected by the price index in society. However, we show in the working paper version (Eguia and Xefteris 2018b)
that our results hold for any price index; therefore, for ease of presentation, we …x the price index to one and thereafter omit the distinction between nominal and real wealth.
Let C denote the set of all possible vote-buying mechanisms (all cost functions from R to R + ): A perfect execution of a mechanism c 2 C would entail society choosing
However, we assume that the execution of any mechanism entails some element of uncertainty, so that the mapping from actions to outcomes is stochastic: while the probability that d = A is increasing in P j2N n a j ; it is not a step function.
Formally, we assume that there exists an outcome function G : R ! [0; 1] such that for any n 2 Nnf1g and any a N n 2 R n ; the probability that d = A is G P 
(x) = 0 and lim
Condition (i) is neutrality. Condition (ii) is a responsiveness condition: if the vote margin is su¢ ciently large, the outcome is the one with the vote advantage with probability arbitrarily close to one. Condition iii) requires the tails of the density not to drop to zero too steeply. The set G contains, among others, all Student-t distributions.
We assume that G 2 G; but G is not known to the mechanism designer, and hence we will propose mechanisms whose results are robust for any G 2 G, including those that are arbitrarily close to a step function with discontinuity at zero, as in Figure 1 . Figure 1 : An outcome function G:
Strategies. Each agent i in society N n with size n 2 Nnf1g , facing a social choice problem of importance 2 R ++ to be decided according to mechanism c 2 C under uncertainty G 2 G; and taking into account that the ex-ante distribution of attitudes toward the decision is given by distribution F 2 F; chooses an action a i 2 R as a function of the realization i 2 [ 1; 1] of her own attitude toward the decision. We assume actions are taken simultaneously, that the tuple (n; F; ; c; G) is common knowledge, and that each attitude i is private information to agent i: Therefore, for any given tuple (n; F; ; c; G), a pure strategy is a mapping s : [ 1; 1] ! R: Let S be the set of all feasible pure strategies. For each s 2 S and each 2 [ 1; 1]; let s( ) 2 R be the action taken given according to strategy s; always given (n; F; ; c; G): For each s 2 S; for each n 2 Nnf1g; and for each i 2 N n ; let s i = s denote that agent i chooses strategy s: We say that a strategy s is monotone if @s @
0:
Utilities. Given a society N n with (n; ; F; G) 2 Nnf1g R ++ F G and given a mechanism c 2 C; for any agent i 2 N n , we can compute the expected utility of agent i as a function of her attitude i ; her strategy s i and the strategy pro…le of every other player s i : 
is equal to
where
and
Game. For each tuple (n; ; F; c; G) 2 Nnf1g R ++ F C G ; let (n; ;F;c;G) denote the game played by the n players in society N n ; with strategy set S for each agent, and expected utility given by EU i in Expression (1) for each n 2 Nnf1g and each i 2 N n :
Equilibrium. For any tuple (n; ; F; c; G) 2 Nnf1g R ++ F C G ; let BN E (n; ;F;c;G) S n denote the set of pure Bayes Nash Equilibria of game (n; ;F;c;G) : We are interested in the subset of symmetric pure BN E; in which each player plays the same pure, monotone strategy. Let E (n; ;F;c;G)
S denote the set of pure and monotone strategies that constitute a symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium of game (n; ;F;c;G) : Hereafter, an "equilibrium"is always a strategy s 2 E (n; ;F;c;G) :
Sequence of societies. We consider a sequence of societies fN n g 1 n=2 :
We will establish results for su¢ ciently large societies. Note that aside from size n 2 Nnf1g; ( ; F; G) are the characteristics that identify a particular social choice problem. These characteristics are common knowledge among members of the society, but they are unobserved by the mechanism designer, who only knows that 2 R ++ ; F 2 F and G 2 G: The problem we address is to design a mechanism that has desirable properties for any ( ; F; G) 2 R ++ F G;
for any su¢ ciently large n:
Social preferences. For each n 2 Nnf1g; let R n denote a complete and transitive relation over R n ; interpreted as a preference over valuation pro…les: for any 2 R ++ and
We can interpret this preference as a preference held by the mechanism designer, or as an abstract preference relation over valuation pro…les. Let R fR n g 1 n=2 denote an in…nite sequence of such preferences over valuation pro…les. For each n 2 Nnf1g; de…ne as well the strict preference
where : denotes the negation of a logical statement.
A sequence R of preferences over valuation pro…les determines a social preference over fA; Bg as a function of n; and N n :
De…nition 1 For any (n; ; N n ) 2 Nnf1g R ++ R n ++ ; and any preference over valuation pro…les R n ; alternative A is socially weakly preferred to B if and only if ( N n ) R n ( N n ) ; and is socially strictly preferred if
Alternative B is socially weakly [strictly] preferred given R n if A is not socially strictly
[weakly] preferred.
Welfare representation. If the preference relation over valuation pro…les R n is continuous, then it can be represented by a continuous function (Debreu 1954) . We refer to this utility representation as a "welfare" function. 6 We say that a welfare function
if for any n 2 N, for any 2 R + ; and for any N n ;~ N n 2
Let sgn : R ! f 1; 0; 1g be the sign function, de…ned by sgn(x) = 1 if x < 0;
sgn(x) = 0 and sgn(x) = 1 if x > 0: For each 2 R ++ ; de…ne the Bergson welfare function
and let R n denote the preference relation over valuation pro…les in R n represented by W : We refer to the set S 2R ++ fR n g as the set of Bergson preference relations. Bergson preference relations are the only ones that satisfy the following collection of axioms: continuity, anonymity, neutrality, monotonicity, separability, and scale invariance. 7 These axioms, together with a particular value 2 R ++ ; uniquely identi…es a particular preference relation R n over R n .
Parameter measures how much the preference over valuation pro…les responds to intensity of individual preferences over alternatives. Each value 2 R ++ can be interpreted as a distinct normative axiom on preferences over valuations, in addition to the collection above.
Social Choice correspondences. For any n 2 N; a social choice correspondence SC n :
Bg maps a pair ( ; N n ) into the subset of normatively desirable social
n=1 denote a sequence of social choice correspondences. For each 2 R ++ ; and for each n 2 N; de…ne the Bergson choice correspondence 6 Given that this function represents preferences on the social choice only, our approach is in line with the standard "micro"version of welfarism. See Moulin (2004) for a discussion of the advantages of microwelfarism over macrowelfarism. 7 See the working paper version (Eguia and Xefteris 2018b) for a de…nition of the axioms, and Eguia and Xefteris (2018a) for a more detailed explanation. The original axiomatization is due to Roberts (1980) and Moulin (1988) .
SC
n by
Note that SC n is the social choice correspondence that chooses the alternative(s) that are socially preferred given the Bergson preference over valuation pro…les R n (which is represented by the Bergson welfare function W ). De…ne the sequence of Bergson social choice
Implementability.
We say that a vote buying mechanism c asymptotically implements a sequence of social choice correspondences SC over a given subdomainF F of possible distribution functions from which attitudes are drawn if two conditions hold: i) an equilibrium exists for any large society; and ii) in equilibrium, the probability that the social decision coincides with the alternative chosen by SC converges to one. For any subclass of vote-buying mechanisms C C; we say that a sequence SC 2 SC is implementable by C overF if there exists c 2 C that implements SC overF:
For any F 2 F and any n 2 Nnf1g; let d n F (s; N n ) be the social decision considered as a random variable that depends on the realization of the attitude pro…le N n and on the realization of the outcome given G(
The formal de…nition of implementation is then as follows.
De…nition 2 For anyF F; a vote-buying mechanism c 2 C asymptotically implements a sequence of social choice correspondences SC overF if for any ( ; F; G) 2 R ++ F G; i) there isn 2 N such that for any n n; the set of equilibria E (n; F;c;G) is non empty, and ii) for any " 2 (0; 1) and for any sequence of equilibria fs t g 1 t=n ; there exists n "; ;F;G 2 N such that for any n > n "; ;
For any subset of vote-buying mechanisms C C; we say that a sequence of social choice correspondences SC is asymptotically implementable by C overF if there exists a mechanism c 2 C that asymptotically implements SC overF.
Since our implementation results are always asymptotic, if a mechanism c asymptotically implements SC, then we say simply that c "implements SC:"
This implementation notion requires that, if the society is su¢ ciently large, the outcome in every equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism must be the outcome desired by the social choice rule with probability arbitrarily close to one, for any distribution parameters.
Depending on the domain of distributionsF under consideration, such robustness across societies may not be attainable. We then seek, as a second best, a mechanism that works for most societies in the domain under consideration.
We de…ne generic asymptotic implementability accordingly. For any C C; we say that a sequence of social choice correspondences SC is generically asymptotically implementable by C C if there exists a mechanism c 2 C that generically asymptotically implements SC.
If a mechanism c asymptotically implements a sequence of social choice correspondences SC generically, we say simply that c "implements SC generically."
Results
We establish a …rst result: Bergson social choice correspondences are generically implementable by a vote-buying mechanism with a power function cost of votes. We relegate all proofs to the Appendix. Admissible vote-buying mechanisms. We specify the set of admissible vote-buying mechanisms C A C: LetĈ C be the set of continuously di¤erentiable non-negative functions de…ned over R that are twice continuously di¤erentiable over Rnf0g: For any c 2Ĉ; de…ne (c) lim
as the limit of the elasticity of c at zero (if it exists). Let
and c(a) = c( a) for any a 2 Rg. The intuition on C A is that, in addition to continuity and di¤erentiability, an admissible cost functions has the following properties:
i) abstention (acquiring no votes) is free;
ii) to encourage positive participation, the marginal cost of votes at zero is zero, so for any strictly positive willingness to pay per vote, some strictly positive quantity of votes can be acquired at that price;
iii) but the elasticity of the cost function near zero is greater than one (so c is strictly convex) near zero, and thus the marginal cost of votes becomes positive immediately; iv) and while elsewhere the cost function need not be convex, this marginal cost is always positive for all positive quantities; v) and very high quantities of votes are prohibitively expensive; and vi) neutrality: votes for A cost the same as votes against A.
Note that C P C A , i.e. all power functions with exponent greater than one are admissible vote-buying mechanisms.
Asymptotically equivalent Social Choice correspondences.
We say that two sequences of social choice correspondences SC and f SC are asymptotically equivalent if the probability that they select the same outcome converges to one, as n ! 1:
We say a property holds generically if it holds in an open dense subset of the set under consideration. To formally de…ne generic asymptotic equivalence of SC and f SC over F, we need to de…ne more structure on F: 
. We can now precisely de…ne the desired asymptotic equivalence notion.
De…nition 4 For any F 2 F, two sequences of social choice correspondences SC and f SC are asymptotically equivalent with respect to F if lim
We say that SC and f SC are generically asymptotically equivalent if they are asymptoti-
For ease of exposition, and since all our results are asymptotic, we refer to generically asymptotically equivalent sequences as "generically equivalent."
We can now state our main result: a complete characterization of the class of sequences of social choice correspondences that are generically implementable by each admissible votebuying mechanism. We show that the set of social choice correspondences implemented by any given admissible vote-buying mechanism c is entirely determined by the mechanism's limit elasticity (c). that (ĉ) = 2; soĉ implements utilitarianism as well. Put di¤erently: quadratic voting implements utilitarianism not because its marginal cost is linear, but rather, because its limit elasticity at zero is 2, and any other mechanism with limit elasticity of 2 also implements utilitarianism.
We next sketch the most relevant steps of the proof, relegating the formal details, and all lemmata, to the appendix.
For any admissible vote-buying mechanism, and for any society size, the game satis…es
Reny's (2011) existence conditions, so an equilibrium exists (Lemma 1).
In any sequence of equilibria, individual vote acquisitions converge to zero: lim n!1 s n ( ) = 0 (Lemma 3). As individual acquisitions converge to zero, the ratio of the marginal costs corresponding, for instance, to two distinct types of alternative A supporters, must converge to the ratio of the attitudes of these types (Lemma 5). That is, for every ( ;^ ) 2 (0; 1] 2 , we get:
Moreover, the function J : R 2 ++ ! R given by:
J(x; y) = 8 > < > :
converges to (c) 1 as (x; y) ! (0; 0) (Lemma 9). Hence,
and thus substituting the left hand side according to lim
That is, the equilibrium vote acquisitions become proportional to the ratio of the attitudes raised to a power that depends on the limit cost elasticity; and this leads to the Utilitarianism is the Bergson rule with = 1; so it is implemented by any mechanism with limit elasticity (c) = 2; such as a quadratic cost function. Majority rule is equivalent to the limit = 0: as the limit cost elasticity (c) (de…ned as marginal cost over average cost) at zero diverges to 1, the marginal cost of votes becomes arbitrarily larger than the average cost, so everyone converges toward acquiring the same amount of votes. 10 A decentralized, competitive market for votes, similar to the ones proposed for instance by Dekel, Jackson and 9 Note that admissible vote-buying mechanisms are "bounded" in the sense of Jackson (1992), but they are not "strategically simple" in the sense of Börgers and Li (2017) . Nor are they robust to coalitional deviations (Bierbrauer and Hellwig 2016). 10 For instance, if c(a) = jaj 1 , any quantity of votes smaller than one is free, while any quantity of votes above one is in…nitely expensive, leading all players to acquire exactly one vote.
Wolinski (2008) and Casella, Llorente-Saguer and Palfrey (2012), implements the opposite extreme, = 1: as the limit cost elasticity converges to 1, the marginal cost of votes becomes identical to the average cost -as in a competitive market-and the agent or agents with most intense preferences purchase most votes and determine the social decision.
Casella, Llorente-Saguer and Palfrey (2012) interpret the outcome with a market for votes as a utilitarian welfare loss. We interpret the …nding di¤erently: the outcome is optimal if the society aims to choose according to the wishes of whoever has the most intense preference.
If that's the goal, a centralized market for votes with linear pricing such as ours, or a decentralized one like Casella, Llorente-Saguer and Palfrey's (2012), are optimal. If that is not society's normative goal, then we should not price votes linearly. Rather, we should choose the pricing scheme that implements society's normative goal.
Finally, we address a substantive concern: wealth inequality. A common criticism of votebuying mechanisms is that in practice they would favor the rich, e¤ectively disenfranchising the poor. In our theory, as in previous theories of vote-buying mechanisms, agents are risk neutral and preferences over wealth are separable, so there are no wealth e¤ects: agents' actions are independent of their wealth. Concerns about the e¤ects of wealth inequality arise if agents are risk averse and the distribution of preferences over the social choice depends on wealth. If so, wealthier agents acquire more votes, their preferences are overweighed, and the optimality of the mechanisms is lost: the axiom of anonymity is violated.
Fortunately, if individual wealth is observable and contractible, then we can restore optimality with respect to anonymous rules by using mechanisms such that the cost function conditions on individual wealth. By compensating the lower marginal utility of wealth of rich agents with an individualized higher monetary cost per vote for these agents, a wealthdependent vote-buying mechanism induces all agents to condition their vote acquisitions exclusively on their intensity of preferences over the social decision, and not on their wealth (details are available from the authors upon request).
Appendix
In this section, we prove our results. The proof is long. It proceed in nine steps.
One -We note existence of an equilibrium for any parameter tuple (Lemma 1). Two -We prove that net vote acquisitions for A are strictly increasing in attitude (Lemma 2), and we use this result to write the …rst order condition of the individual optimization problem (Equation (3)).
Three -We prove that equilibrium vote acquisitions converge to zero (Lemma 3 establishes the result for most attitudes; later Lemma 8 extends this result to all attitudes).
Four -We prove that the ratio of marginal costs converges to the ratio of attitudes (Lemma 5).
Five -We prove that the marginal bene…t of acquiring votes converges to zero (Lemma 7), and use this result to prove that the third and fourth steps extend to all attitudes (Lemma
8, Corollary 2).
Six -We prove that the ratio of vote acquisitions converges to a power function of the ratio of attitudes; …rst we prove it piecewise (Lemma 10) and then over the whole domain (Lemma 11).
Seven -After two technical lemmas (Lemma 12 and Lemma 13) we establish a su¢ cient condition for a sequence of social choice correspondences to be implementable over a subset of distribution functions that is open and dense over the set over all cumulative distribution functions (Proposition 2). Proposition 1 follows immediately.
Eight -We …nd a necessary condition for such implementation (Proposition 3).
Nine -We show that the necessary condition is su¢ cient for generic implementability, establishing our main result (Theorem 1).
Lemma 1 For any tuple (n; ; F; c; G) 2 Nnf1g R ++ F C A G; an equilibrium of game is also an equilibrium of game (n; ;F;c;G) :
Lemma 2 For any (n; ; F; c; G) 2 Nnf1g R ++ F C A G; for any s n 2 E (n; ;F;c;G) ;
; and for any n 2 Nnf1g and any x 2 (n 1)X; de…ne ' n (x) Pr
; and de…ne h n : (n 1)X ! R + as the probability density of H n such that
Then, given any equilibrium s n 2 E (n; ;F;c;G) ; the optimization problem of agent i 2 N n with
11 We discuss these conditions and explain why they hold in the working paper version (Eguia and Xefteris 2018). or equivalently
Since G is continuously di¤erentiable and the constraint a i 2 X is not binding, we obtain a solution by the First Order Condition
Note that since g is strictly positive in R; and P
follows that the summation within the parenthesis on the left-hand side of Equation (2) is strictly positive for any a i 2 X; and thus the left hand side is overall strictly increasing in i : Assume a i = a 2 X is a solution to the First Order Condition (2) for agent i with attitude i ; and for an arbitrary agent j 2 N n nfig; assume j 6 = i ; without loss of generality assume j > i : Then, the left hand side of Equation (2) has a lower value than the left hand side of the analogous First Order Condition to the optimization problem of agent j: Hence, a j = a cannot solve j 0 s …rst order condition, so it must be s n ( j ) 6 = s n ( j ) and thus for any ; 0 2 [ 1; 1] such that 6 = 0 we obtain s n ( ) 6 = s n ( 0 ); which, since s n is weakly increasing, implies s n is strictly increasing.
As an immediate corollary to Lemma 2, H n does not have a mass point, so for each n 2 N nf1g; we can de…ne the probability density function h : (n 1)X ! R + so that
Given any equilibrium s n 2 E (n; ;F;c;G) ; the …rst order condition for the optimization problem of player i 2 N n with attitude i 2 [ 1; 1] can be simpli…ed to: For each n 2 Nnf1g; and for each k 2 f1; :::; ng; let E[s n ( )] denote the expectation of the random variable s n ( k ); where we drop the subindex k because the expectation does not depend on k. For each n 2 N nf1g and for each k 2 f1; ::; ng; de…ne as well the independent, identically distributed random variables 
for any k 2 f1; :::; n( )g; for any 2 N:
For each 2 N; de…ne V ( N n( ) nfig ) as the cumulative distribution of the random variable
: By the Berry-Esseen theorem (Berry 1941; Esseen 1942) , there exists a 2 R ++ such that for any 2 N and any x 2 R;
For each 2 N; de…neĤ ( N n( ) nfig ) as the cumulative distribution of the random variable P k2N n( ) nfig q n( ) ( k ); and letĥ ( N n( ) nfig ) be its density function. For any z 2 R ++ and any
denote value at x of the cumulative distribution of a normal distribution with mean zero and variance z: Then,
are bounded as well for any 2 N, and hence fE[
is bounded, and the right hand side of Inequality (4) converges to zero as diverges to in…nity. Thus, the random variable P
with cumulative distributionĤ (x) converges as ! 1 to a mean zero Normal distribution with vari-
Since G is strictly increasing and neutral (G(x) = 1 G( x)), and lim
G(x) = 0, then for any " 2 0; 
Since js n( ) ( 0 )j for every 2 N (…rst paragraph of this proof), it then follows that
implies that s i = s n( ) is a strictly dominated strategy), it follows that for any
For each 2 N; and for any arbitrary agent i 2 N n( ) with i = 0 ; the expected utility of playing a i = s n( ) ( 0 ); minus the expected utility of playing a i = 0; is:
which is equal to
Ĥ ( x) Ĥ (x) = 0; and thus lim !1ĥ (x) = 0 for any x 2 ( x;x); and hence
Therefore, the limit of Expression (7) as ! 1 is equal to the limit of
which by Expression (6), is strictly smaller than
so playing a i = 0 is strictly better, and hence s i = s n( ) ( 0 ) is not a best response, so s n( ) is not an equilibrium. Thus, we reach a contradiction. Thus, there does not exist 0 2 ( 1; 1)
such that lim n!+1 s n ( 0 ) 6 = 0; and it must be that lim n!+1 s n ( ) = 0 for each 2 ( 1; 1):
The next lemma reformulates the First Order Condition (3) into a form that proves more convenient for subsequent results. Recall we use the notation X [ c 1 (2 ); c 1 (2 )];
Lemma 4 For any tuple ( ; F; c; G) 2 R ++ F C A G; for any sequence fs n g 1 n=1 such that s n 2 E (n; ;F;c;G) for each n 2 Nnf1g; for any n 2 Nnf1g; and for each 2 [ 1; 1];
Proof. For any given n 2 Nnf1g; only a compact subset of the domain of G, namely [ nX; nX] is relevant, since ns n ( ) 2 nX for any : And G is twice continuously di¤eren- 
We want to show that for any x 2 (n 1)X; and any 2 [0; 1]; there exists a z (x) 2
For each x 2 (n 1)X; de…ne y min arg min y2[x;x+s n ( )] g 0 (y) and y max arg max
Since g is continuous, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists some value y(x) 2
Then, de…ne z (x) y(x) x and we obtain Equality (9).
An analogous argument, in this instance with y(x) 2 [x + s n ( ); x]; establishes that for any 2 [ 1; 0]; there exists a z (x) 2 [s n ( ); 0] such that Equality (9) holds.
The next lemma uses Lemma 4 to establish that the ratio of marginal costs of two agents converges to their ratio of attitudes.
Lemma 5 For any tuple ( ; F; c; G) 2 R ++ F C A G; for any sequence of equilibria fs n g 1 n=2 , and for any ( ;^ ) 2 ( 1; 1) 2 ;
Proof. For any tuple ( ; F; c; G) 2 R ++ F C A G; let fs n g 1 n=2 be a sequence of equilibria, that is, s n 2 E (n; ;F;c;G) for each n 2 Nnf1g:
Notice that since g is strictly positive and continuous, and g 0 is continuous, for any
x; y 2 R;
is continuous, and over any closed interval of R; it is bounded. Further, by
Condition (iii) of the de…nition of G; 9" 2 R ++ such that for any " 2 (0;");
2 R and lim
Therefore, there exists 2 R ++ such that
2 [ ; ]; for any " 2 (0; ") and for any x 2 R: Equivalently,
Since for any sequence fs n g z (x) = 0 for each 2 [ 1; 1] and for each x 2 (n 1)X: Then, it follows from Expression (11) , that that that there existsn 2 N such that for any n 2 N such that n >n; for each x 2 (n 1)X, for any 2 ( 1; 0) [ (0; 1), and for any equilibrium strategy s n ; we have:
Therefore,
Once again since lim n!1 s n ( ) = 0 for each 2 ( 1; 1) (Lemma 3), there existsñ such that 1 s n ( ) > 0 for every n >ñ.
Then we can integrate x over (n 1)X on all sides and multiply by 2 to obtain:
and hence, substituting Equality (8), for any 2 ( 1; 0) [ (0; 1);
Then, for any ;^ 2 ( 1; 0) [ (0; 1);
Note that because lim n !1 s n (~ ) = 0 for any~ 2 ( 1; 0) [ (0; 1) (Lemma 3) and s n (0) = 0 for any n 2 N, both limit points of the interval converge to ^ as n increases to in…nity. Hence,
The next lemma proves the following observation: a cost elasticity greater than one near zero implies that the cost function is convex near zero. ; applying L'Hopital rule,
Hence, for any " 2 R ++ ; there exists " 2 R ++ such that for any a 2 (0; " ];
Select " = Next we establish that the marginal e¤ect of acquiring votes over the outcome converges to zero (Lemma 7).
Lemma 7 For any tuple ( ; F; c; G) 2 R ++ F C A G; and for any sequence of equilibria
Proof. By Lemma 6, there exists a 2 R ++ such that c 0 is strictly increasing in ( 
and, since lim n !1 s n ( ) = 0 for any 2 ( 1; 1) (Lemma 3), it follows that
which, since c 0 (0) = 0 and thus (c 0 )
which, for any 2 ( 1; 1)nf0g; implies lim
Lemma 7 allows us to more easily strengthen Lemma 3 by showing that vote acquisitions converge to zero for every realization of attitudes, including 2 f 1; 1g. 
By de…nition of G; and since G 2 G; G is strictly increasing and continuously di¤erentiable, thus g is continuous and strictly positive, and hence g and
are bounded over any closed interval of R: Further, also by de…nition of G; 9" 2 R ++ such that lim
2 R
and lim
2 R for any " 2 [0;"): In particular, for " = 0;
is bounded over R; and
is bounded over R as well, so there exists some K 2 R ++ such that
and hence, by Lemma 7,
As a corollary of Lemma 8, we can more strengthen Lemma 5 so that it holds for any
Corollary 2 For any tuple ( ; F; c; G) 2 R ++ F C A G; for any sequence of equilibria fs n g 1 n=2 , and for any
The proof follows step-by-step the proof of Lemma 5, noting, where needed, that lim n!1 s n ( ) = 0 for 2 f 1; 1g by Lemma 8.
We next de…ne an auxiliary function and prove a lemma related to it. De…ne J : R J(x; y) = lim
Notice that (c) lim
; so applying L'Hopital rule,
so lim
J(x; y) = (c) 1: Note as well that, using L'Hopital rule
so J is continuous.
De…ne the function v :
By Equality (14), lim
= (c) 1 and hence lim 
Note that for any y 2 R ++ ; and for any x 2 (0; y); J is di¤erentiable and
(ln x ln y) J(x; y) implies @J @x (x; y) = 0, it follows that for any y 2 R ++ and any x 2 arg max n g 1 n=1 such that s n 2 E (n; ;F;c;G) for each n 2 Nnf1g; and for any ( ;^ )
by Lemma 5 and Corollary 2, lim
and taking logarithms on both sides,
By Lemma 9, for any fx n g 
thus, in particular,
and thus substituting the left hand side according to Equality 15, we obtain
Further, we can strengthen this result, to obtain linearity in ( ) :
Lemma 11 For any tuple ( ; F; c; G) 2 R ++ F C A G, for any fs n g 1 n=1 such that s n 2 E (n; ;F;c;G) for each n 2 Nnf1g; and for any ( ;^ )
Proof. 
Hence, for any
which, by Lemma 5 and Corollary 2, is equal to j j j^ j
: Thus,
Note that the left hand side of Expression (18) is equal to lim
2 R + , so we can take logarithms on both side, and obtain
thus, in particular, Proof. Consider an arbitrary F 2 F : By de…nition of F ; it follows from F 2 F that E F [sgn( )j j ] 6 = 0: Without loss of generality, assume E F [sgn( )j j ] > 0; that is,
for some 2 R ++ : For any " 2 R ++ ; let N " (F ) be the open " neighborhood around F; in the metric space (F; d 1;1 ): For any " 2 R ++ , and for anyF 2 N " (F );
which implies
; and thus,
; it follows that
To show that F is dense in (F; d 1;1 ); let F 2 F be such that E F [sgn( )j j ] = 0; and, We can now prove a main proposition.
Proposition 2 For any 2 R ++ ; the sequence of social choice correspondences SC is implementable over F by any vote-buying mechanism c 2 C A such that (c) = 1+ .
Proof. Let c be any mechanism in C A such that (c) = 1+ : For any ( ; F; G) 2 R ++ F G; let fs n g 1 n=1 be a sequence such that s n 2 E (n; ;F;c;G) for each n 2 Nnf1g. Then, by Lemma 11, for any 2 [ 1; 1];
For each n 2 Nnf1g; de…ne the function
: For each n 2 Nnf1g; n is a monotone function de…ned on a closed interval, and by Expression (20) , the sequence f n g 1 n=1 converges pointwise to the continuous function sgn ( ) j j : It follows from Polya's lemma (Lemma 13) that f n g 1 n=2 converges uniformly to function sgn ( ) j j : That is, for any " 2 R ++ ; there existsn(") such that for any 2 [ 1; 1] ; and for any n >n(");
Take any F 2 F such that E F [sgn( )j j ] > 0; and any" 2 0; E F [sgn( )j j ] : By the weak law of large numbers, the random variable 
Since, by Inequality (21), for any n >n("); Pr SC n ( ; N n ) = A = 1:
From Lemma 7,
and since g(x) > 0 for any x 2 R; from Equality (25) we obtain that for anyx 2 R ++ ;
Since g is continuous, it attains a minimum in [ x;x]; and this minimum is strictly positive.
Since h n (x) 2 R + for any x 2 R and for any n 2 Nnf1g; it then follows that 
Note that equalities (23) and (26) together imply that
For any " t 2 R ++ ; and for anyx t 2 R ++ such that G(x t ) > 1 " t ; Equality (27) Pr SC n ( ; N n ) = B = 1; so c asymptotically implements SC over the set F 2 F such that E F [sgn( )j j ] < 0 :
Hence, c asymptotically implements the sequence of social choice correspondences SC over the set of cumulative distributions F .
Noting that for any k 2 (1; 1); (c) = k for c(x) = jxj k ; it follows from Proposition 2 that for any 2 R ++ ; SC is implemented over F by the power vote-buying mechanism c(x) = jxj
1+
; or, equivalently, that for any any k 2 (1; 1); the power vote-buying mechanism c(x) = jxj k implements SC 1 k 1
: Proposition 1 is then established by this observation, and Lemma 12.
After having detailed su¢ cient conditions for generic implementability in Proposition 2, we next prove that these conditions are (almost) also necessary. Let SC denote the set of all possible sequences of social choice correspondences.
Proposition 3 Any SC 2 SC that is not generically equivalent to SC for any 2 R ++ ; is not implementable generically over F by C A .
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Assume c 2 C A implements SC generically. We show that there exists 2 R ++ such that SC is generically equivalent to SC .
Recall that for any vote-buying mechanism c 2 C A ; (c) 2 (1; 1): Then note that from Proposition 2, for any 2 R ++ ; any vote-buying mechanism c 2 C A with (c) =
implements SC over F ; so de…ning z 1+ ; and hence = For any SC 2 SC that is not generically equivalent to SC for any 2 R ++ , SC is not implementable generically by C A over F, by Proposition 3.
